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The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and
Tenure-Its Historical Development
Glenn R. Winters*
In the 1968 Pennsylvania primary election the voters of that state
adopted in toto the recommendations of their constitutional conven-
tion. Included among these recommendations was a revision of the
Pennsylvania judicial article. This revision contained as one important
element a proposal for the adoption of what has come to be known as
the Merit Plan for judicial selection and tenure.'
As set forth in the draft article prepared by the Pennsylvania Bar
Association's "Project Constitution"-2 and adopted by the voters, 3 this
plan calls for appointment of certain Pennsylvania judges by the
governor of the state from lists of names submitted to him by a judicial
nominating commission. Judges appointed under this proposal would
serve a probationary period extending until the first municipal election
occurring more than twenty-four months after their appointment. At
this time their names would be submitted to the voters for approval
without competing candidates. The sole question for the voters would
be whether or not the named judge should be retained in office. Upon
receiving an affirmative vote, the judge would remain for a term of ten
years, after which a similar vote again would be taken; if the vote
should prove negative, the office would become vacant and the vacancy
would be filled by the process of nomination and appointment.
There are three distinguishing features of this plan:
1. Nomination by a commission.
2. Selection by appointment.
3. Tenure by vote of the people in a non-competitive election.
A.B., J.D., University of Michigan; Editor, JUDICATURE; Executive Director, AmericanJudicature Society.
1. This amendment provides that the merit plan shall be merely an option and shall
not go into effect unless specifically approved by the voters in the 1969 primary election.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(d).
2. "Project Constitution" was an undertaking in 1961 by the Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
tion to study Pennsylvania's constitution and make recommendations for its modernization.
33 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 14-20 (1961); 33 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 365-66 (1962). In 1963 the membership
of the Association decided on an article by article approach to amending the constitution
and approved 23 separate amendments. Also in 1963 the Board of Governors of the Asso-
ciation created a special committee on Project Constitution. 34 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 147-325,
605, 606 (1963).
3. See note 1 supra, and accompanying text.
Duquesne Law Review
These together comprise what has come to be known as the Merit
Plan. They are found in just that pattern in eight states--Alaska,
Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and Oklahoma.4
They also occur in other combinations-nomination and appoint-
ment without the non-competitive election in five states-Alabama,
Idaho, New York, Utah and Vermont and in the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico; 5 the non-competitive election without the nominating
commission in California and Illinois.6 Adding together these three
groups makes possible the statement that some or all of the Merit Plan
is in use with respect to some or all of the judges of fifteen states and
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
An indication of the present-day surge in popularity of the Merit Plan
as a reform measure may be found in the fact that of the fifteen states
mentioned, ten or two-thirds of them, adopted it in the decade of the
'60's. 7 The legislature of Indiana in 1967 gave a new judicial article
containing it the first of two successive passages needed to submit it to
the voters.8 It was approved by the Maryland constitutional convention
of 1968 (although the constitution as a whole was defeated on other
grounds), and was narrowly defeated in the Hawaii constitutional con-
vention and in a North Dakota election in September, 1968.9 The list of
4. Alaska, supreme and superior courts, ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5-9, ALASKA STAT.
§§ 22.05.080, 22.05.100, 22.10.100, 22.10.120, 22.10.150; Colorado, all courts of record, CoLo.
CONST. art. VI; Florida, Metropolitan Court of Dade County (Miami), Home Rule Charter
§§ 603, 6.04 and 6.06; Iowa, supreme court and district courts, IOWA CONST., art. V,§§ 15-18; Kansas, supreme court, KANSAS CONST. art. III, § 2; Missouri, supreme court,
courts of appeal, circuit courts of St. Louis and Jackson County, probate courts of St.
Louis and Jackson County, St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction; may be extended by
local option (but has not been) to all courts of record, Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29; Nebraska,
Supreme and District Courts, NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21; Oklahoma, supreme court and
court of criminal appeals, OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B.
These citations and a chart showing the courts to which the provisions apply may be
found in G. WINTERS, SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 185 (1967).
5. Alabama circuit court of Jefferson County, ALA. CONST. amend. LXXXIII and CX;
Idaho, supreme court and district court, IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 19, Idaho Session Laws
1967, ch. 67; New York, criminal court of New York City, family court and interim va-
cancies to Civil Court of New York City by voluntary action of Mayor John V. Lindsay.
See 49 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 197 (1966). Utah, supreme and district courts, UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 20-1-7.1 to 7.9; Vermont, supreme, superior and district courts, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4,§§ 571-76 as amended, 1968; Puerto Rico, superior and district courts by voluntary action
of Governor Roberto Sanchez Vilella. See 49 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 198 (1966).
6. California, supreme and district courts of appeal, CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 26; Illinois,
supreme, appellate, district and circuit courts, ILL. CONST. art. V, §§ 10, 11.
7. Colorado, 1966; Florida, 1963; Idaho, 1967; Illinois, 1962; Iowa, 1962; Nebraska, 1962;
New York, 1966; Oklahoma, 1967; Utah, 1967; Vermont, 1966. Puerto Rico also adopted
its voluntary use of merit selection in this period (1966).
8. Indiana General Assembly Gives Initial Approval to Amendment, 50 JUD. 281 (1967).
9. Adkins and Fairbanks, The Annapolis Achievement, 51 Jun. 288 (1968); Maryland
Constitution is Defeated, 52 JUD. 37 (1968). Oklahomans, North Dakotans Defeat Judicial
Reform Proposals, 52 JUD. 169 (1968); Hawaii Con-Con Defeats Merit Selection, Lengthens
Judges' Terms, 52 JUD. 171 (1968).
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other states moving toward merit selection is nearly as long as those
that are not.'0
The plan here referred to as the Merit Plan has several other
names as well. It is called the Missouri Plan after the first state to use it,
the American Bar Association Plan, after ABA endorsement of it in
1937,"1 the American Judicature Society Plan and the Kales Plan.
The "Kales" referred to was Albert M. Kales, professor of law at
Northwestern University in the early years of this century. Shortly after
the founding of the American Judicature Society in 1913, Kales ac-
cepted the post of "director of drafting," and over the next several years
the Society produced a remarkable series of drafts of legislative and
constitutional measures embodying important new proposals in court
and bar organization, civil and criminal procedure, judicial selection
and tenure, and related fields.' 2 The judicial selection drafts contained
a crystallization of ideas that Kales had first advanced in his book
Unpopular Government in the United States.1
Texts of present day versions of the Merit Plan, both adopted
and pending, differ in some respects from what Professor Kales was
advocating in 1914. This is not surprising. Indeed, it would have been
10. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia
and Wyoming.
11. The House of Delegates of the A.B.A. adopted the following resolution in the 1937
annual meeting; 62 A.B.A. REP. 893 (1937):
Whereas, the importance of establishing methods of judicial selection that will be
most conducive to the maintenance of a thoroughly qualified and independent judi-
ciary that will take the state judges out of politics as nearly as may be, is generally
recognized; and
Whereas, in many states movements are under way to find acceptable substitutes for
direct election of judges;
Now therefore be it resolved, by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso-
ciation that in its judgment the following plan offers the most acceptable substitute
available for direct election of judges:
(a) The filling of vacancies by appointment by the executive or other elective official
or officials, but from a list named by another agency, composed in part of high judicial
officers and in part of other citizens, selected for the purpose, who hold no other public
office.
(b) If further check upon appointment be desired, such check may be supplied by
the requirement of confirmation by the state senate or other legislative body, of ap-
pointments made through the dual agency suggested.
(c) The appointee after a period of service should be eligible for reappointment
periodically, or periodically go before the people upon his record, with no opposing
candidate, the people voting upon the question, "Shall Judge Blank be retained in
office?"
12. An Act to Establish a Model Court for a Metropolitan District, 4 AM. JUD. Soc'Y
BULL. (1914), and subsequent revisions contained in 4-A AM. JuD. Soc'y BULL. (1915) and
4-B AM. Jun. Soc'Y BULL. (1916); State-Wide Judicature Act, 7 AM. JUD. Soc'Y BULL. (1914);
and a revision in 7-A AM. JuD. Soc'Y BULL. (1917); Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 AM. JUn.
Soc'Y BULL. (1919); judicial Council Act, 5 J. AM. Juo. Soc'Y 107-109 (1921).
13. A. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1914).
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surprising if there had not been considerable evolution in judicial
reform thinking over such a span of time. By the same token, others
before Kales had been studying the problems of judicial selection and
tenure and had offered their own ideas, some of which were clearly
forerunners of the Kales proposals.
At a time when prospects seem good that by the end of the next
decade the Merit Plan will have supplanted popular election as the
dominant mode of judicial selection in this country, it seems appropri-
ate to pause to examine the origins of this plan and trace its develop-
ment, not only in the constitutions and statute books but in the think-
ing and writings of men like Kales, Roscoe Pound, Herbert Harley,
John Perry Wood and others.
The train was already moving when Albert Kales climbed aboard.
The elective judiciary got its start in the 1840's nearly three-quarters
of a century after 1776.14 It swept the country, except for certain
Atlantic seaboard 'states, during the next 50 years,15 but by the close of
the 19th century disenchantment had begun to set in. Listings under
the heading "judges" in the Index to Legal Periodicals for the years
around the turn of the century and the first decade of this century
reveal a growing awareness of the judicial selection problem and some
groping for answers. Articles in the American Lawyer in 1903 and
1905 on "An Elective Judiciary-Its Defects,"' 6 and "Influence of the
Bar in the Selection of Judges Throughout the United States,"'17 are a
clue. The most widely quoted sentence in Roscoe Pound's famous 1906
address on "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Adminis-
tration of Justice""' was this one: "Putting courts into politics, and
compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions has
almost destroyed the traditional respect for the bench."' 19
Most significant in the pre-Kales era was a symposium on "What is
the Best Method for Selecting Judges and Solicitors-General?" at the
1909 annual meeting of the Georgia Bar Association.20 Two proposals
14. Winters, A Better Way to Select our Judges, 34 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 167-168 (1951).
15. HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES, ch. 4 (1944). Haynes, at 100, reports
that Mississippi in 1832 was the first state to elect all judges. New York followed Mississippi
in 1846. "Within 10 years, fifteen of the twenty-nine states existing in 1846 had by consti-
tutional amendment provided for the popular election of judges, and of the states which
have entered the Union since 1846, every one has provided that most or all judges shall be
popularly elected for terms of years."
16. 11 AM. LAW. 288 (1903).
17. 13 AM. LAW. 165 (1905).
18. The speech is reprinted in 46 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 55 (1962).
19. 46 J. AM. Jtm. Soc'y 55, 66 (1962).
20. REPORT OF THE 26TH ANNUAL SESSION OF THE GEORGIA BAR ASSOCIATION 208-229 (1909).
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offered there are noteworthy. John T. Norris suggested that the gov-
ernor send three names to the state senate, which would make the final
selection. 21 Hewlett A. Hall proposed that the judges of the court of
last resort be elected and that the trial judges be nominated by the
supreme court, appointed by the governor, and confirmed by the
senate.
2 2
In 1913 the American Bar Association met in Montreal, and William
Howard Taft, then a former president and future chief justice of the
United States, addressed it on the subject of selection of judges. He
severely criticized both partisan and non-partisan election and urged a
return to the appointive system.2
It was in this climate that the American Judicature Society was
founded and Albert M. Kales entered upon his work as its director of
drafting. It is important to look carefully at what Kales both did and
did not propose at that time. Our main sources are his Unpopular
Government book, and the selection and tenure features of the Model
State-Wide Judicature Act,2 4 and the Model Court for a Metropolitan
District,25 which he drafted.
Kales proposed first that vacancies in the judiciary should be filled by
appointment by the chief justice who should himself be chosen by the
electorate at fairly frequent intervals.26 This is strongly reminiscent of
the Georgia proposal for nomination of trial judges by an elected
supreme court. Kales offered many of the same reasons as did Hall,2 7
and in addition he cited the successful experience in New Jersey of vice
chancellors appointed by the chancellor.2
The second element of the original Kales plan was a device to avoid
the arbitrariness often thought (both then and now) to be associated
with life tenure. Kales mentioned several possible ways of limiting the
judges' tenure, and then offered this suggestion:
The appointment might be for a probationary period-say three
years-at the end of which time the judge must submit at a popu-
21. Id. at 218.
22. Id. at 225, 226.
23. 38 AM. B. Ass'N REP. 418-35 (1913). See especially pages 421-24.
24. 7 AM. JuD. Soc'Y BULL. (1914).
25. 4 AM. JuD. Soc'y BULL. (1914).
26. In Kales' words, "The most promising [method of selection] is the conspicuous and
legal appointment by a chief justice elected at large in the district at frequent intervals."
A. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 251 (1914) (hereinafter cited as
KALES). See also 4 Am. JuD. Soc'v BULL. 29-40 (1914), 4 AM. JuD. Soc'Y BULL. 47-89 (1915),
7 AM. JUD. Soc'Y BULL. 38-39, 61-62, 84-87 (1914).
27. KALEs, at 239-44.
28. Id. at 239 n.l.
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lar election to a vote on the question as to whether the place
which he holds shall be declared vacant. This is not a vote which
puts anyone else in the judge's place, but a vote which can at most
only leave the place to be filled by the appointing power. Such a
plan must necessarily promote the security of the judge's tenure
if at the popular election his office be not declared vacant. After
surviving such a probationary period his appointment should con-
tinue for-let us say-six or nine years. At the end of that time
the question might again be submitted as to whether his place
should be declared vacant.29
This constitutes a very clear enunciation of the principle of tenure
by noncompetitive election, and as far as I have been able to determine
it was entirely original with Kales, no hint of such a device having been
found in any prior writings that have come to my attention. This
device remains a feature of the Merit Plan in substantially the same
form today and it is in actual operation in ten states.30
It has been protested that since the heart of the Merit Plan is the
nominating commission, and since Kales did not include a nominating
commission in his proposals, it is therefore an inaccuracy to call the
Merit Plan the Kales Plan. I would go so far as to agree that present-
day merit plans differ from the things Kales proposed in all three
respects-nomination, appointment and elective tenure-but no more
than normal and proper evolution of ideas in the stimulating and crea-
tive intellectual atmosphere of those years would naturally bring
about. The basic principles of the three features of merit selection
and tenure, including the nominating commission, are to be found in
that same historic Kales book written in 1914.
Kales proposed that the chief justice and the presiding justices of all
the divisions of the court should form a judicial council with adminis-
trative and disciplinary powers. As a "slight but reasonable control"3'
upon the appointing power of the chief justice he proposed:
"The judicial council should be given power to appoint upon an
eligible list for each division of the court twice as many members of
the bar as there are judges in the division. The chief justice, in appoint-
29. Id: at 246.
30. Alaska, ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6; California, CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 26; Colorado,
COLO. CONsT. art. VI, § 25; Florida, Dade County Home Rule Charter, § 6.04; Illinois, ILL.
CONST. art. V, § 11; Iowa, IOWA CONST. art. V, § 17; Kansas, KANSAS CONST. art. III, § 2(e);
Missouri, Mo. CONsT. art. IV, § 29(c)(1); Nebraska, Nr. CONSr. art. V, § 21; Oklahoma,
OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B. A chart indicating the use of non-competitive elections is con-
tained in G. WINTERS, SELECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 185 (1967).
31. KALEs, at 250.
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ing judges to a place in any division of the court, should be required
to select from this eligible list on the occasion of every other appoint-
ment at least.' 32
There are differences of course between this judicial council and its
eligible list, and a present-day Missouri or Nebraska commission sub-
mitting three names to a governor. It is, however, the prior participa-
tion (as distinguished from subsequent approval or confirmation) of
a group of knowledgeable people charged with the responsibility of
making an affirmative search for judicial talent and making the names
of a list of such persons available to the appointing authority, with a
requirement that, at least part of the time, he must restrict his appoint-
ments to only names so listed.
It is fair to say that this council was at least a rudimentary nominat-
ing commission. Nomination by the council, appointment by the elected
chief justice, and tenure by non-competitive election, all set forth ex-
plicitly in Kales' 1914 book, establish beyond dispute the propriety of
referring to a present-day nominative-appointive-elective plan as the
Kales plan.
The judicial selection provisions of the state-wide and metropolitan
court acts which Kales drafted during the next year or two were simply
legislative embodiments of the Kales proposals advanced in the Un-
popular Government book. Herbert Harley, founder and first secretary
of the American Judicature Society, took the next step in a 1916 article,
proposing mandatory appointment from the Council's nominations in
all instances, rather than just every other one. 33
In 1920 Amos C. Miller proposed a plan subsequently approved
by the Illinois Constitutional Convention of 1922, requiring the
governor to appoint judges in Cook County not from a standing
eligible list but from an ad hoc list of four names submitted to him by
the state supreme court.34 At the same time the Louisiana State Bar
Association was proposing in another constitutional convention guber-
natorial appointment from nominations submitted by the Supreme
Judicial Council, a body such as Kales had proposed, consisting of
twelve judges.35 These proposed Illinois and Louisiana commissions
32. Id.
33. Harley, Taking Judges Out of Politics, 64 THE ANNALS 184 (1916). See especially
page 193.
34. 4 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 31 (1920); 5 J. AM. Jut. Soc'Y 50-52 (1921); 6 J. AM. Juv. Soc'y
5 (1922).
35. The Special Committee on Judiciary Ordinance of the New Constitution, REP. LA.
B. Ass'N at 20-21 (1920); 5 J. AM. JuD. Socy at 19-25 (1921).
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differed from present-day commissions only in the composition of the
nominating body.
All nominating proposals so far mentioned have involved judges only.
Harold J. Laski, a brilliant American lawyer who made a name for
himself in the English legal world and is well remembered for his volu-
minous published correspondence with Oliver Wendell Holmes,3 6 con-
tributed a very scholarly article to the Michigan Law Review in 1926
on "Techniques of Judicial Appointment."3 7 Laski proposed guber-
natorial appointment with the aid of an advisory committee consisting
of a judge of the supreme court, the attorney general and the president
of the state bar association. Here, for the first time, we find a lawyer
as well as judges participating in the nominating function. In the same
year, Charles E. Matson proposed to the Nebraska State County Attor-
neys Association an elected "State Commission for Selection and Ap-
pointment of Judges. '38 This body would have had the full appointing
power, and it is noteworthy in that it is the first proposal in which lay-
men might have had a part, since it was not specifically restricted either
to judges or to lawyers and judges. A strong proposal for a commission
like Matson's, with actual appointing power, has been advanced very
recently by Jason L. Honigman, for consideration as an amendment
to the Michigan judicial article.39
It is perhaps well to pause and reflect that these are not actualities
that have been described so far, but only the thoughts and ideas of
men in whose minds important frontiers of judicial administration
were being pushed back.
In 1928, two years after the Laski article, Herbert Harley wrote a
thoughtful editorial proposing that the governor, not the chief justice,
pick from an eligible list and that the list be compiled through use of
a bar plebiscite.40 From this time forward, little or nothing is heard
about appointment by an elected chief justice, and more and more is
heard about bar *participation in both judicial appointments and judi-
cial elections. This idea has reached its zenith in the truly tremendous
contribution in recent years by the American Bar Association through
36. HOLMES-LASKI LETrERS (Howe ed., 1953).
37. 24 MIcm. L. REv. 529-543 (1926).
38. 14 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y at 13, 14 (1930).
39. Selected Readings on the Administration of Justice and Its Imorovement-Michigan
Citizens Conference on Judicial Selection and Tenure, at 69 (1967). The proposal received
much favorable discussion in the conference, but the final consensus was in favor of a
nominating commission.
40. 11 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y at 132 (1928).
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its Committee on Federal Judiciary which screens candidates and ad-
vises the U.S. Justice Department in regard to federal judicial appoint-
ments.
41
The year 1931 marked an important development in the evolution
of the Merit Plan, for it is then that we find the first suggestion of the
final element in the present-day nominating commission-the lay citi-
zen member. The occasion was an editorial discussion of a proposal
in The Panel, a publication of the Grand Jury Association in New
York, for a non-partisan commission to make recommendations for
judicial elections in New York.42 It was said of this-proposal:
"The article quoted does not disclose the nature or source of the
proposed commission, which is the keystone of the project. But we as-
sume that it is to be an unofficial and unsalaried commission composed
of delegates from the bar and various citizen organizations."43 (Italics
added.)
It remained for Walker B. Spencer of Louisiana to put together
for the first time all of the various elements of which we have been
speaking-
1. A commission
2. composed of judges
3. and lawyers
4. and laymen
5. to submit nominations
6. to the governor
7. for appointment
8. subject to tenure by non-competitive election.
Mr. Spencer spoke at the 1931 annual meeting of the American Ju-
dicature Society,44 and he included all of those elements in his descrip-
tion of the plan which I have previously mentioned as having been
introduced in the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1921.45 It
is very clear that this is not an accurate description of the plan that
was actually introduced, which, as I have indicated, called for an all-
.41. B. G. Segal, Federal Judicial Selection-Progress and the Promise of the Future, 46
MAss. L.Q. 138-151 (1961). Segal was the chairman of the ABA Committee on the Federal
Judiciary from 1956 to 1964. Its reports are to be found in each of the annual volumes of
American Bar Association Reports since 1952. See, e.g., 91 ABA REP. 484-495 (1966).
42. Mandelker, The Selection of Judicial Personnel, THE PANEL, at 7-8 (Sept.-Oct. 1930).
43. 14 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y at 190, 191 (1931).
44. 15 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y at 76, 77 (1931).
45. See, pp. 67, 68 and note 35 supra.
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judge council, such as Albert Kales had proposed to do the nominat-
ing. However, the record is clear that the Spencer plan suffered many
revisions between its original drafting and its actual introduction into
the convention, and it is an unsupported but not unreasonable conjec-
ture that in 1931 Mr. Spencer was remembering an actual version of
the plan as drafted by him prior to its being amended to bow to polit-
ical expediency. Ben R. Miller, author of an authoritative book on
the history of the Louisiana judiciary,46 has confirmed that Spencer
was indeed a brilliant and original thinker and it appears that he de-
serves more credit than has yet been given him.
The decade of the 30's witnessed a rapid increase in professional dis-
cussion of judicial selection problems, and new ideas came thick and
fast. In Georgia and Utah 47 there appeared proposals for appointment
by the governor from lists of nominees submitted by the bar. At the
1933 American Bar Association convention in Grand Rapids, the Con-
ference of Bar Association Delegates, forerunner of today's ABA House
of Delegates, conducted a symposium on judicial selection at which
numerous proposals were advanced and discussed, most of them calling
for some form of bar association participation or lawyer-layman nom-
inating commissions, with appointment by the governor.48
California came close to being the first state to bring merit selection
from fantasy to fact. In 1933 the legislature approved a bar association
plan for Los Angeles County under which the governor would appoint
from nominations submitted by the state chief justice, the presiding
justice of the court of appeals and a state senator.49 It was defeated at
the polls in 1934.50 Much more widely known is the plan that was ap-
proved at that same election and has been in force ever since in that
state, whereby the governor appoints supreme and appellate court
judges with subsequent confirmation by the chief justice, the presiding
justice of the court of appeals and the attorney general. 51 Now, 34 years
later, the State Bar, the Judicial Council and Governor Ronald Reagan
46. B. MILLER, THE LOUISIANA JUDICIARY (1932).
47. 16 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y at 40-43 (1932); 16 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 185 (1933).
48. 19 A.B.A.J. at 669-674 (1933).
49. Text of the bar association proposed amendment is contained in 8 CALIF. S.B.J. at
54-56 (1933). Passage of the amendment by the legislature is reported in 8 CALIF. S.B.J. at
141, 191, 197 (1933).
50. 18 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y at 102 (1934).
51. The amendment adopted was proposed by the State Chamber of Commerce. It is
discussed in 9 CALIF. S.B.J. at 38, 39 (Part II, No. 9) (1934) and PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE S.B. OF CAL. 145 (1934). The plan is CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 26.
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have joined forces to procure adoption of a California Merit Plan, with
commission nomination, for all California judges.52
In 1937 the ABA House of Delegates formally endorsed adoption of
the Merit Plan as an Association objective, 53 and John Perry Wood,
leader of the California movement in the 1930's, became chairman of
the American Bar Association committee to lead the ABA campaign.
In that capacity he came to St. Louis in 1938 to advocate a merit selec-
tion plan for Missouri. 54 Two years later Missouri became the first state
actually to put a nominative-appointive-elective plan into operation and
make "Missouri Plan" along with "Kales Plan" one of the synonyms
for merit selection and tenure.55 "Spencer Plan" really should be added
to that list.
The form of the Missouri commission is similar to that set forth
in Pennsylvania's new Constitution-three lawyers selected by the
bar, three laymen appointed by the governor, and the chief justice as
chairman. For circuit judges it is two and two with the presiding judge
of the appellate court as chairman. In selecting this pattern the Project
Constitution drafters were wisely capitalizing on more than a quarter
century of very successful experience in the Show-Me-State.5 6 It would
be foolish to suppose, however, that the Missouri Plan could not be
improved upon. A number of states have followed along and have de-
vised some interesting and promising variations.
In 1963 the voters of the City and County of Denver adopted a merit
plan for the Denver Municipal Court, now the County Court, with a
seven man nominating commission consisting of the Denver Bar Asso-
ciation president, two lawyers, and four non-lawyers, with the presiding
judge as a non-voting ex officio member.57 Both lawyers and non-law-
yers are appointed by the mayor, who also makes the judicial appoint-
ments. It is noteworthy that in this commission the laymen have a 4-3
52. THE STATE BAR OF CAL. REP. I (Sept.-Oct. 1967).
53. 23 A.B.A.J. 104-5 (1937). See also note 11, supra.
54. Winters, A Better Way to Select Our Judges, 34 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 166-67 (1951).
55. "Missouri Plan" as enacted in Mo. CONST. art. V, § 29. It was passed November 1940
by a majority of 90,000 votes. A resolution was immediately introduced in the legislature
to repeal the new amendment. 11 Mo. BAR. J. 209 (1940). In 1942 the voters, as a result of
the above resolution had an opportunity to vote for a constitutional amendment which
would repeal the Missouri Plan. The voters, in an off year election supported the Missouri
Plan by over 132,000 votes. 26 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 100 (1942). In 1945, Missouri voters had
another opportunity to vote on the "Missouri Plan" when an entire new Constitution was
voted upon. Again the voters approved.
56. See Hunter, A Missouri Judge Views Judicial Selection and Tenure, PROCEEDINGS,
A CITIZENS CONFERENCE ON THE MODERNIZATION OF PENNSYLVANIA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM at 62-70
(1964); 48 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 126 (1964).
57. Denver, Colorado, Home Rule Charter, § 13.8-3.
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voting majority, and also it is important to note that both lawyers and
laymen are to be selected on a bi-partisan basis. The Missouri Plan is
called the Non-Partisan Court Plan, but its non-partisanship consists
only of a prohibition of political activity on the part of both commis-
sion members and judges. The Denver plan affirmatively requires po-
litical balance between the two major parties within the commission.
The Colorado state plan adopted in 1966 follows the Denver example
both as to lay majority and as to bi-partisanship. 58
The Kansas commission has a lawyer elected by the bar and a non-
lawyer appointed by the governor from each congressional district, plus
a lawyer elected from the state at large, who is chairman. This commis-
sion has no judge at all. 59 The Oklahoma commission has a lawyer and
a layman from each congressional district plus a thirteenth member
who is a non-lawyer, chosen by the other commission members. 60 Thus,
in Oklahoma, too, the laymen have a majority.
The most ingenious nominating commission to be adopted in recent
years is that for the Utah juvenile courts. It is a five-member commis-
sion which is entirely ex officio, consisting of the chief justice of the
supreme court, the state bar president, the chairman of the public wel-
fare commission, the state superintendent of public instruction and the
state director of public health. The first three may, if they wish, desig-
nate another member of their respective organizations, and the supreme
court member is chairman of the commission. 61
Yet another variation is the Vermont commission designated to aid
the legislature in exercise of its legislative appointment power. Not
surprisingly, members of the legislature are in the majority, three of
each house with at least one each from the minority party, plus two
laymen appointed by the governor and three lawyers elected by the
bar association. 62
A closer examination of the proposed Pennsylvania Merit Plan re-
veals it to be similar to all of the plans described above, but identical
to none. The delegates who drafted the Pennsylvania merit plan evalu-
ated those plans adopted by other states and produced yet another vari-
ation on the theme.
Of the three distinguishing features comprising the merit plan for
58. COLO. CONST. art. Vl, § 24.
59. KANSAS CONST. art. 3, § 2(f).
60. OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B § 3.
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-69 (1965).
62. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 571 (1966).
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the selection of judges, selection by appointment and tenure by vote
of the people in a non-competitive election are very similar to corre-
sponding stages in those plans already in existence. The actual appoint-
ment of one of the nominees by the governor is common to all of the
state-wide plans in effect.6 3 The retention and tenure stage, whereby a
judge may retain his position through a non-partisan, non-competitive
election following a probationary period, is part of merit plans in ten
other states. 64 This probationary period in the Pennsylvania plan ex-
tends from the time of appointment to the first municipal election oc-
curring twenty-four months or more after said appointment.65
The first stage in the process of selecting judges is the nomination
and it is here that we see the uniqueness of the Pennsylvania merit
plan. This stage commonly involves the appointment of laymen, mem-
bers of the bar and judges to positions on a nominating commission.
The opportunity for variation is greatest at this stage because of the
many possible combinations in the composition of the nominating com-
mission. The Pennsylvania nominating commission represents both a
previously untried formula and an effort to incorporate the best fea-
tures of other plans.66
The nominating commission, to be known as the Judicial Qualifica-
tions Commission,67 combines the unique features of both the Colo-
rado and Kansas plans. 68 It consists of seven members: four laymen
appointed by the governor and three members of the Pennsylvania Bar
to be appointed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Commission
members are to be appointed for seven year terms on a staggered basis
with one member nominated each year. In an endeavor to insure as
near as possible a non-partisan selection of nominees, the plan prohibits
more than four members of the commission from being members of
the same political party. Too, commission members may hold neither
a paid political office nor an office in a political organization. 9
Should a vacancy occur for any reason on the benches of the Supreme
Court, Superior Court or any other state-wide court, the commission
would then submit the names of from ten to twenty qualified persons
63. See text at pp. 70-72.
64. See note 7, supra.
65. PA. CONST. art. V § 13(e).
66. Preparatory Committee for the Constitutional Convention, The Judiciary, Refer-
ence Manual No. 5, Part II §§ 7.3.3, 7.3.4.
67. PA. CONST. art. V, § 14.
68. The Kansas plan has no judge on its nominating commission and the Colorado plan
has a majority of laymen on its commission. See text at pp. 71, 72.
69. PA. CONST. art V § 14b.
Duquesne Law Review
to the governor. From that list he would select and appoint one person
to fill the vacancy. Additionally, such appointments would not require
the consent of the Senate.
Acceptance of the Merit Plan by the people of Pennsylvania 70 would
represent a significant advancement in the process of consistently se-
lecting a qualified judiciary. Though the objection has been raised that
the abolition of partisan, competitive elections is undemocratic and will
not remedy the evils of the present method,71 support for merit plans
has been firmly established in the many states which have adopted some
form of it and in those states which have given earnest consideration
to a merit plan.
The Pennsylvania solution does not, however, represent the ultimate
level of development of the merit plan. To complete the evolutionary
process and thereby arrive at the best possible formula, it will be nec-
essary in the future for states adopting similar plans to cull from the
multifarious experiences of the pioneer states the most successful fea-
tures of their plans. They will be required to evaluate the story of merit
selection, from the time it was only a gleam in the eyes of men like
Roscoe Pound, Albert Kales and Herbert Harley, to trace its history
down to its approval by the American Bar Association in 1937, its in-
corporation into the National Municipal League's Model State Con-
stitution 72 and the American Bar Association's Model Judicial Article,73
its adoption by the new Oklahoma judicial article approved in July of
1967,74 and its incorporation in the revision of the Pennsylvania judi-
ciary article. 75 Merit plan selection of judges is in its infancy. 7 Many
other states will be coming along in the next few years and while it is
not possible to foresee the future, some speculation on the probable
evolution of the plan seems warranted.
It seems certain that although the commissions have wisely moved
away from the all-judge format, they will not move entirely away and
will continue to have some judicial representation. This makes sense
for the obvious reason that, as the saying goes, "it takes one to know
one." If you were selecting somebody to make a trip to the moon and
70. See note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
71. Reference Manual No. 5, Part II § 5.2, 5.3.4, 7.3.4.
72. The National Municipal League published its first Model State Constitution in 1921.
It was revised in 1928, 1933, 1944, 1948 and 1963. Copies of the Model State Constitution
may be purchased from the National Municipal League in New York City.
73. 87 A.B.A. REP. 392-99 (1962); 45 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y at 280-82 (1962).
74. OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, adopted July 11, 1967, at a special election.
75. See note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
76. See note 8, supra.
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there was someone around who had already been to the moon and back,
wouldn't he be a good person to have sitting in on those deliberations?
Too, the trend against having the judge as chairman will continue.
Laymen tend to put a halo on a judge, and lawyers tend to wonder
how he is going to feel about them when that case comes around next
week. There exists some concern that in some instances (no doubt
a minority), depending on individual personalities, a judge chairman
might unduly dominate the commission.
The trend toward more and more lay membership will probably con-
tinue. I think the lawyer viewpoint is important, just as is the judicial
viewpoint, and lawyers and judges are useful commission members for
those reasons. An all-lawyer commission, however, would tend to exag-
gerate the purely technical skills of a good lawyer, and the broader
viewpoint of the layman on non-legal considerations of general intel-
ligence, education, personal integrity and other human qualities is
needed. A lawyer majority, or a lawyer-judge majority on the commis-
sion gives critics an opportunity to charge that the whole system is a
scheme to contrive organized bar domination of the bench. For these
and other reasons, I believe that an all-layman commission will make
its appearance, and it will make good selections, even on the technical
points, because it will know how to get good legal advice. Businessmen
know how to get good legal counsel for their businesses and they even
change counsel on occasion. It might be an advantage to a commission
not to be limited to one, two or three lawyers chosen for them by some-
one else.
Disappearance of the confirmation by the senate (or other body) de-
vice may be expected. It has already proved itself to offer no significant
assistance in the selection process and what significance it has is 95 per
cent political. As an element of the judicial selection process it has de-
generated in almost all instances to a meaningless rubber stamp,7 7 and
it will disappear as the eyes disappeared from the fish swimming in the
perpetual darkness of Mammoth Cave. That this is already occurring
can be seen by looking at Pennsylvania. Under its proposed merit plan
the appointment by the governor constitutes the final step.
The device of tenure by non-competitive election also will pass out
of the picture. A review of the discussion concerning it in Kales' Un-
popular Government book makes clear that it was originally offered
77. The current rule in Pennsylvania is that if the senate is in session, the governor
must submit his selection to that body for approval.
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only to quiet the fears of those devotees of the elective method who
might be willing to acknowledge that a commission of knowledgeable
people could do a better job than the voters in finding the right kind
of judicial talent to begin with but were concerned that there would
be no adequate way to get a judge who went wrong off the bench. One
of the saving features of the elective process is that, in theory at least,
if the voters make a mistake and pick the wrong man they can correct
the mistake and dismiss him at the end of his term. There was appre-
hension that even though a commission might make fewer mistakes it
could still make them, and that security of tenure would itself encour-
age the judges to let themselves go and become unreasonable and dif-
ficult, and there would be nothing that anybody could do about it.
Since Kales' time, however, a new institution has appeared on the
horizon to handle problems of judicial discipline and removal far better
than the voters possibly could. I say "new" but actually this too is to
be found in the Kales blueprint-the judicial council which he would
have had not only to nominate but also to exercise disciplinary powers
over the judges under it. 7 s Its first actual embodiment was a "Court on
the Judiciary" established by constitutional amendment in New York
in 1948, with judges representing all levels of the state judiciary to hear
and decide charges against judges.7 9 In 1960 California established a
"Commission on Judicial Qualifications," composed of judges, lawyers
and laymen, for a similar purpose. s0 Courts or commissions based on
one or the other of these patterns, with variations, of course, have been
set up in Oklahoma, Illinois, Texas, Florida, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana and Maryland,"' and something of the
kind is included as a component or an adjunct, of most of the merit
plans now on the drawing boards in other states.
I do not say that there is not still a valid justification for giving the
voters a last veto against a present-day Jeffreys who might conduct his
own twentieth century "bloody assizes," but I do think that the quali-
78. KALES, 249.
79. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 22-24.
80. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §? 8, 18; Burke, Judicial Discipline and Removal-The Cali-
fornia Story, 48 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y at 167-172 (1965).
81. Oklahoma, OKLA. CONST. art. VII-A; Illinois, ILL. CONSr. art. VI, § 18; Texas, Tax.
CONST. art. V, § l-a; Florida, FLA. CONST. art. V, § 13 B; Nebraska, NEB. CONST. art. V,
§§ 28-31; New Mexico, N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32; Colorado, CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 23;
Maryland, MD. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4A, 4B. Commissions were approved on November 5,
1968, by the voters in four states, Idaho, Louisiana, Oregon and Utah, the latter one to
come into existence only upon enactment of implementing legislation. Voters Approve
Judicial, Constitutional Reforms, 52 JUD. 182 (1968).
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fications commission is a much better answer to that problem, and that
the chief role of the non-competitive elective tenure in the future will
be a reassurance to people who are steeped in the elective tradition
that in adopting a merit plan they are not actually giving up everything
but are still retaining an essential part of the elective system, and just
getting some needed help in the hard part. This is bound to be a di-
minishing role as more and more states switch to initial selection by
nomination and appointment, and I think the ultimate pattern of
merit selection and tenure probably will turn out to be nomination by
a commission and appointment for life or good behavior, the issue of
good behavior being determined by a California-type Judicial Quali-
fications Commission. 2 There have been suggestions, and the plans
enacted in Idaho8 3 and pending in Indiana 4 are so drafted, that a single
commission may serve both the nominating and the disciplinary func-
tion. I am wary of that, because I can see the possibility, even though
remote, that the commission might some day decide to oust A in order
to turn around and install B in his place. I do not think that ought to
be possible; the two functions should be in separate hands.
A better key to true non-partisanship will be found. The ideal an-
swer is for everyone involved to put politics completely out of mind
with respect to both commission membership and judicial appoint-
ments. Among human beings that is an unattainable ideal. The most
practical way to neutralize opposing forces is to balance them, and that
is the theory behind bipartisanship in commission memberships. To
make selections on a party basis for a position that is supposed to be
non-partisan is a contradiction, however, and one that has mystified
our friends across the sea., 5 An entirely new and better approach is
needed. That approach probably will be by way of perfecting our means
of discovering and evaluating the affirmative traits which make for ex-
cellence in judicial performance, and, having assured ourselves of get-
ting them, indulging in the luxury of ignoring irrelevant considerations
like party affiliation to the point of not caring what the judge's political
leanings may have been prior to appointment, or how many of which
party are now on the bench.
82. This viewpoint was persuasively presented a few years ago by Nelson, Variations on
the Theme-Selection and Tenure of Judges, 36 So. CAL. L. REv. 4-54 (1962).
83. Idaho Sess. Law.1967, ch. 67.
84. Laws of State of Indiana (1967), ch. 375; Report of Indiana, Judicial Study Com-
mission, p. 143 (1966). See also, note 8, supra.
85. See, editorial, "How to Lose a Ball Game." 45 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 304, 305 (1962);
The Nebraska Institute for Judicial Nominating Commissioners, 51 Jun. 351 (1968).
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It is unfortunately true that there is no magic in even a well selected
and well intentioned commission. The commission members are sure
to approach their job with doubt and uncertainty and they need guid-
ance and help if they are to do their job well. They need a means to
avoid making the same mistakes that their predecessors have made and
to profit from their constructive experience.
In the summer of 1967 the American Judicature Society in coopera-
tion with the University of Denver conducted a one-day institute for
members of the Colorado nominating commissions. Experienced mem-
bers of commissions in Missouri and other states were brought in for
lectures and panel discussions, and a record was made of the entire
proceedings. Another similar event was held in Lincoln, Nebraska, in
January of this year for the Nebraska commission members.8 6 I can
predict that as more and more states adopt merit selection there will be
more and more of these institutes, supplemented by a growing litera-
ture arising out of them, and, I hope, by some careful research into
judicial qualifications and characteristics and how to identify and eval-
uate them.8 7
In my opinion the concept of ex officio membership on nominating
commissions, as in the Utah juvenile court plan, will gain in favor.
It is impossible to stack or control this commission. Its members are
persons of ability and distinction, chosen for their main jobs because
of preeminence in their respective fields. Their function in the making
of judicial nominations is collateral to their primary field; they may
be expected to bring to the commission's deliberations informed and
intelligent judgment based on their desire to provide for good judicial
service to the area that is their primary concern. Surely many other
states will be persuaded of the wisdom of a nominating commission
so constituted.
Finally, I predict that by the end of the decade of the '70's merit se-
lection and tenure will have taken over to the point that the general
level of the judiciary, in terms of intelligence, integrity, legal ability
and quality of performance will be such that problems of judicial per-
sonnel will have receded into the background and will have been sup-
planted by who knows what new crises that now lie below the horizon.
86. First Workshop for Nominating Commissions, 51 JUD. 62-64 (1967).
87. For information articles exploring this area see M. Rosenberg, The Qualities of
Justices-Are They Strainable?, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1063-1080 (1966), Mott, Measurement of
Judicial Personnel, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 262-277 (1948).
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